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TILTING AT WINDMILLS
Andrew L. Frey*
Prior to joining the Office of the Solicitor General in May
1972, at the age of 33, I had enjoyed a variety of experiences as
a lawyer-D.C. Circuit law clerk, Counsel to the Governor of
the Virgin Islands, associate in a law firm practicing principally
before the now defunct Civil Aeronautics Board-but had
argued only two appeals, each time as a court-appointed lawyer
in a criminal case. Number three was to be a horse of a different
color.
In order to reduce the pressure a new lawyer might feel, the
practice in the SG's Office was to assign as a first argument a
case of comparatively modest importance that was, regardless of
the quality of the advocates' oral arguments, either a sure winner
or a sure loser. There could be little doubt in which category my
maiden effort fell. While the Court's opinion characterized the
issue in Bronston v. United States as "narrow but important,"'
there was no conflict in the circuits on the issue, which then as
now was the main basis for granting review; nor was the issue of
such nationwide significance as to require authoritative
resolution by the Supreme Court. But in a few cases each Term,
the Court would grant review because the ruling below simply
seemed intolerably wrong. This appeared to be such a case.
Bronston was a perjury prosecution. The defendant was the
principal of a movie production company that had filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter XI, and the allegedly perjurious
testimony was given in the course of the following examination
by creditors:
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The company had an account there for about six months, in
Zurich.
The second answer was literally true, but unresponsive to
the question, which concerned Bronston's personal bank
accounts. What Bronston "neglected" to say was that he had
personally had a very substantial account in a Swiss bank for
over five years. He was prosecuted for perjury on the theory
that, though perhaps literally true, his statement was false by
implication and intended to mislead. In affirming the conviction,
a divided court of appeals held that
[f]or the purposes of [the perjury statute] an answer
containing half of the truth which also constitutes a lie by
negative implication, when the answer is intentionally
given in place of the responsive answer called for by a
proper question, is perjury.
When one of my first assignments as a rookie in the SG's
Office was the merits brief in the Bronston case, it was clear that
my first-argument destiny was sealed. In the process of writing
the brief-defending the basic rationale of the court of appeals
while at the same time attempting to articulate a limiting
principle that would provide a basis for affirmance yet would
not vastly overextend the reach of the perjury statute-I fell prey
to the lawyer's common tendency to come to believe that the
position he or she is advancing has considerable merit and could
be embraced by a reasonable jurist. Indeed, in my most private
moments I actually told myself that I might, just might, pull it
off and somehow win this most unpromising specimen of a case.
When I was being more realistic, the question was whether I
could get any votes at all.
By the time I was formally assigned the Bronston
argument, I had performed the first essential act of the
government Supreme Court advocate-acquiring my argument
outfit. Then as now, male counsel representing the government
2. U.S. v. Bronston, 453 F.2d 555, 559 (2d Cir. 1971).
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in the Supreme Court (and there were few women assigned that
role in those days) were required to wear a morning suit with
striped pants, a vest, and a silver-colored tie. In my youth,
before I gained a fuller appreciation for the value of tradition
and ritual, I thought this a silly practice; I showed my rebellion
the only way I could: buying used trousers for $5.00 and a used
coat for $25.00. I did not buy a vest, however, but borrowed one
from a colleague in the Office. Unfortunately, the vest was pearl
gray, not charcoal, and though it had been worn before by the
fellow who loaned it to me, it was my appearance in the vest that
prompted a call from the Chief Justice to the SG a few days after
the argument cautioning that only a charcoal gray vest qualified
as proper attire.
It is very difficult, at a remove of over thirty years, and
with the intervention of sixty more Supreme Court arguments, to
recall my preparations for the Bronston argument, or indeed the
actual event. I can say that I have never enjoyed the process of
preparing for oral arguments, though I almost always find the
argument itself stimulating. For this argument, however, I was
like a Class B minor league pitcher suddenly making a first start
in the major leagues. The saying that best captures the feeling is
that of Dr. Johnson (loosely paraphrased) about how
wonderfully the prospect of one's public hanging concentrates
the mind.
When the day came-November 15, 1972-I donned my
regalia and headed for Court. I had by then seen a few
arguments given by my colleagues, and in that respect had an
edge over many another first-time Supreme Court advocate.
Nevertheless, I was of course nervous; by no means
overwhelmingly so, but nervous enough. Fortunately, the
government was the respondent, so my adversary, prominent
New York criminal lawyer Sheldon Elsen, went first. Sheldon
did, as far as I recall, a fine job, but by the time the Chief Justice
said, "Mr. Frey, you may proceed," I was so charged up with
the desire to refute his (to my advocate's mind, specious) claims
that I entirely forgot that I was supposed to be nervous.
I had diligently prepared my argument in far more detail
than I would today, practicing it before my mirror at home,
timing it to make sure it didn't exceed my allotted thirty
minutes, and indeed was short enough to allow time for
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questions. I needn't have bothered. Although the Burger Court
of that period was a far less outspoken and inquisitive bunch
than today's Court, I was peppered with questions from almost
the moment I had finished the ritual opening intonation, "Mr.
Chief Justice and may it please the Court."
The Justices can be quite cagey in forming their questions,
giving hypotheticals that test the advocate's theories without
disclosing the Justice's own views. And often Justices ask
questions designed to help the advocate whose position they
support make the most effective points. On some occasions,
however, the Justices make little pretext of having doubt about
the proper outcome but simply pound the advocate with
questions-often nothing more than the same question posed in
different ways-that can in no circumstances be answered to the
Justices' satisfaction.
This was the case in Bronston. Why, the Justices wished to
know, did the examining counsel not ask a follow-up question
upon receiving a non-responsive reply to the inquiry about
Bronston's Swiss bank accounts? Don't we have an adversary
system in which it's incumbent upon counsel to be thorough and
precise in their examination of witnesses? And so on. And on.
And on. My response-that the jury had found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Bronston intended by his answers to
deceive his creditors and conceal the personal accounts, and had
in fact succeeded in this deception-was simply met with
reiterations of the same question, followed each time by my
obviously vain efforts to restate or reformulate my basic point. It
was, the Justices all seemed to agree, counsel's job to pin the
witness down. I didn't give up the effort, but they didn't recede
from their positions either.
After this battering had come to a merciful end, I was
consoled by the (seemingly sincere) statement by Deputy SG
Larry Wallace (who himself holds the record for most Supreme
Court arguments in the twentieth century) that my argument was
the best he had ever heard in defense of an indefensible case.
Whatever the merits of that critique, its premise was swiftly
proved when, less than two months later, the Court handed down
a unanimous decision, written by Chief Justice Burger, reversing
Bronston's conviction. The Court did acknowledge the central
premise of my argument in summing up its holding, stating:
FIRST ARGUMENT-FREY
It may well be that petitioner's answers were not guileless
but were shrewdly calculated to evade. Nevertheless, we
are constrained to agree with [the court of appeals
dissenter] that any special problems arising from the
literally true but unresponsive answer are to be remedied
through the "questioner's acuity" and not by a federal
perjury prosecution.
In retrospect, the holding in Bronston seems quite
unremarkable even to me. But the case did generate one
especially interesting recent postscript. President Clinton's
answer regarding the nature of his relationship with Monica
Lewinsky exhibited characteristics that made it similar to the
answers Bronston gave about his Swiss bank accounts. At least
under one interpretation of the President's denial, his testimony,
misleading as it doubtless was, could nevertheless be said to
have been literally true. And, indeed, although no doubt other
considerations were at play, he too escaped conviction for his
testimony.
3. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 362.

